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Abstract
We analyse assignment problems in which not every agent is controlled by
the central planner. The free agents search for vacant tasks autonomously,
guided by their own preferences. The central planner, aiming to maximise
the total value of the assignment, must take into account the behaviour of
the uncontrolled agents. We model this situation as an n + 1-player game
played between n free agents and the central planner. We show that it is
a weakly dominant strategy for the free agents to choose tasks according to
their true preferences. Contrarily, the strategy of the central planner in the
resulting Nash Equilibrium is highly complex – we prove that it corresponds
to the solution of a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem. Finally, we
demonstrate how this program can be reduced to a computationally much
more manageable disjoint bilinear program.
Keywords: assignment problem, stable matching, bilevel optimization
1. Introduction
Problems in economic theory are traditionally analysed in terms of sta-
ble outcomes (equilibria) or efficient solutions (optima). In the former case,
the problem is considered in the context of the interaction of rational, self-
interested, autonomous agents; in the latter, the agents are assumed to follow
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the instructions of the central planner who aims to optimise some objective.
Of course, in realistic economic systems autonomous agents are often placed
together with those controlled by the central planner, like public and private
sectors jointly tackling social problems or locating economic activities. Typ-
ically, the autonomous agents will act to obtain their own individual goals,
and the problem of the central planner is to coordinate the controlled agents
so as to optimise the overall performance of the system, while taking into
account the behaviour of self-motivated participants.
The present paper investigates a particular “semi-autonomous” scenario of
this kind, namely assignment problems in which some of the players are
autonomous and face private incentives to solve certain tasks. Instead of
submitting to the planner’s will, these agents strive to obtain the task that
rates most highly according to their own preference rankings.
We call this situation Runaway Task Assignment (RTA) and model it as a
game played between the central planner and the free agents. In RTA, the
autonomous1 agents, amended to the classical assignment problem, are as-
sumed to have ordinal preferences over the available tasks. This arguably
increases the robustness and applicability of our model. We neither require
the central planner to form a belief about cardinal utility functions of the
autonomous agents, nor do we assume the autonomous agents to be von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximisers. In addition, adopting
ordinal preferences allows us to directly utilise results from a branch of game
theory, usually called matching theory, which originated with the seminal
paper of Gale and Shapley (1962). From the start, matching theory evolved
without drawing on the theory of expected utility.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows.
2. Runaway task assignment in the real world
Runaway task assignments arise naturally in the context of location of
economic activities. In Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), for example, the
authors discuss the assignment problem in the context of choosing locations
for industrial plants under the standard assumption that the central planner
is responsible for choosing the location for all of the plants. However, in
1We use the terms free agents and autonomous agents synonymously.
2
reality such tasks are typically divided between the public and the private
sectors, where private businesses strive to maximise their own profits and the
government is concerned with the overall welfare of the society. Note also
that state institutions often have the priority over private entrepreneurs in
making their choices, consistent with the way we define the RTA game.
As another example, consider private-public partnerships (PPP), where
the public party, which usually supervises the complete project, intends to
advance some public goal. In contrast, the participating private parties are
primarily interested in those subprojects which have commercial potential.
This poses an obstacle for assigning tasks in a globally optimal way. Compa-
nies will try to avoid those tasks which are unprofitable and difficult, trying
instead to obtain subprojects promising high profits at low risk. A typi-
cal example is the provision of health care through hospitals and doctors,
which is facilitated through private-public partnerships in many countries.2
The payment agreements between the government and the private partners
usually do not reimburse a hospital or doctor for exactly those costs associ-
ated with a specific patient. As a result, patients (= “tasks”) yield different
profit opportunities. Although hospitals/doctors (= “agents”) participating
in a PPP are not formally entitled to pick the profitable patients and reject
the others, there may be informal ways to deter unprofitable patients.3 The
model presented in this paper could thereby prescribe an optimal policy for a
public health system which both directly employs medical resources (doctors,
hospitals etc.) and engages private contractors.
In the Internet economy, many crowdsourcing systems (see, e.g., Benkler
(2006); Brabham (2008); Howe (2008)) can also be interpreted to be RTAs. In
a crowdsourcing system, tasks which cannot satisfactorily be solved without
human expertise are assigned to a group of more or less anonymous amateur
problem solvers (the “crowd”). Yet companies making use of crowdsourcing
do not have to totally rely on the crowd. For some of the tasks or even for all
of them, they can engage professional problem solvers. These belong to their
2For an overview of private-public partnerships in the health sector, see Nikolic and
Maikisch (2006).
3By entering “hospital turns away” or a similar phrase into an internet search engine,
one gets plenty of media reports about exactly this issue. For example, UK dentists,
working for the National Health Service, arguably behaved in such a way (Templeton
(2007)). Reports about hospitals being reluctant to examine patients with X-ray or brain
scans may straightforwardly be interpreted as avoidance of unprofitable tasks.
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own personnel or a contractor’s personnel who cannot reject tasks assigned
to them. In contrast, crowd members can freely choose which tasks to work
on, and they are probably not indifferent between all tasks. Hence, the firm
has to find an optimal way of distributing its tasks between professional and
amateur problem solvers.
Disaster response situations, providing prominent examples of crowd-
sourcing, also belong to this category. Consider a disaster relief situation
where professional disaster responders coordinated by the government are
assisted by local residents and disaster survivors. The government has nei-
ther the communication capabilities nor the authority to tell local partic-
ipants what to do. However, local participants are very helpful and their
efforts should not be ignored. Assuming the government can estimate the
preferences of local participants (e.g., they prefer tasks closer to their current
location to those further away), our work provides a way for the government
to assign professional disaster responders optimally.
Situations resembling RTAs frequently occur in military campaigns. The
2011 war in Libya was fought by a coalition of NATO and loosely organised
rebel troops who jointly tried to overthrow the regime of dictator Muammar
Gaddafi. While the NATO forces were totally coordinated, it was arguably
difficult to coordinate the actions of the rebels, who were untrained, un-
professional, and lacked command chains. Consequently, the NATO, as the
central planner of the RTA, had to anticipate the prospective actions of the
rebels when making its decisions on air strikes. Information about the rebels’
next steps was provided by so called liaison officers (NATO representatives
assigned to the rebel units).4
4Autonomous task choice can even be observed within military organisations, which are
otherwise famous for their strict adherence to the principle of obeying orders. In military
history it regularly occurred that ambitious commanders tried to gain fame by acting more
bravely or by taking greater risks than desired by the central command. An outstanding
example is the celebrated Danish naval officer Peter Jansen Wessel (1691-1720), called
Tordenskjold (Danish for “thunder shield”). He constantly strived for the most prestigious
tasks in the Great Northern War (1700-1721), thereby notoriously disobeying orders. His
confrontation with the Swedish fleet in the Battle of Dynekilen (1716) in which his 7
ships captured 31 Swedish ships and destroyed another 13, was not backed by orders of
the admiralty. Wessel’s anarchistic conduct evoked considerable criticism in the Danish
admiralty, eventually leading to a trial at a court-martial. Yet he was acquitted and even
made an admiral later. His disobedience yielded huge personal prestige, as can be seen
from the fact that Wessel is praised in the national anthems of both Denmark and Norway
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3. Model
The Runaway Task Assignment game is a tuple
(F ∪ {cp}, C, T, v,F ,S),
where F∪{cp} is the player set, consisting of n free agents in the set F and one
central planner cp. C is the set of coordinated agents controlled by cp. We call
A := F ∪C the set of agents. T is the set of tasks of the assignment problem.
An outcome of the game is a set µ ⊆ A× T such that if (a, t), (a′, t′) ∈ µ it
must hold a 6= a′ and t 6= t′. The function v : A× T −→ R+ assigns to each
agent-task pair a positive value, its contribution. The central planner prefers
outcome µ for outcome µ′ if
v(µ) :=
∑
(a,t)∈µ
v(a, t) >
∑
(a,t)∈µ′
v(a, t) := v(µ′).
In order to draw on matching theoretic results, we need to assume that
whenever µ 6= µ′, then v(µ) 6= v(µ′). In this way, we ensure that two different
outcomes are never equally desirable from the point of view of the central
planner. F is a preference profile which contains for each free agent f ∈ F
a linear5 preference order f defined over a set Tf ⊆ T .6 The tasks in Tf
are interpreted to be those which can in principle be accomplished by f . S
is an action set profile, containing for each free agent f a set Sf of actions
available to him and one action set Scp of the central planner.
3.1. The action sets
The behaviour of the free players, i.e. the way in which they allocate
themselves to tasks, is crucial for our model. We are going to specify their
search process in this subsection. For simplicity, in what follows we will
assume that there are no ties in the contributions of pairs and the values of
matchings:
(a, t), (aˆ, tˆ) ∈ A× T : (a, t) 6= (aˆ, tˆ)⇒ v((a, t)) 6= v((aˆ, tˆ)) (3.1)
(the country he originated from). For an account of his deeds, see Chapter 1 (“A Knight
Errant of the Seas”) in Riis (2007).
5A linear ordering is total, transitive, and antisymmetric.
6From f , the strict order f and the indifference order ∼f are derived by the standard
rules, i.e. t f t′ ⇔ t′ f t and t ∼f t′ ⇔ t f t′ ∧ t′ f t.
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and
µ, µ′ ∈ µ : µ 6= µ′ ⇒ v(µ) 6= v(µ′), (3.2)
with v(µ) :=
∑
(a,t)∈µ v((a, t)).
We assume that the search process of the free players proceeds as follows.
After the coordinated agents were assigned to tasks by the central planner,
each free agent f approaches the task t := maxf Tf . Note that due to
antisymmetry of f , this task is unique. If f finds t to be vacant, f takes
over t. If f finds that a coordinated player already occupies t, f proceeds
to the task which is second according to the preferences f , namely t′ :=
maxf Tf \ {t}. Again, f checks the availability of t′ and either takes it or
continues with the subsequent item in its priority list. If there are no tasks
left on f ’s priority list which were not yet approached, f stays idle. We
summarize this as:
Behavioral Assumption 1. Each free agent f approaches tasks according
to a linear ordering f defined on a set Tf ⊆ T .
For two free players f ′ and f ′′ it may be the case that Tf ′ ∩ Tf ′′ 6= ∅. So
what happens if f ′ and f ′′ approach the same task t? In this case, we assume
that the agent better at performing the task, i.e.
arg maxa∈{f ′,f ′′} v((a, t))
keeps to t, while the other free agent continues the search process. This
is a realistic assumption for scenarios in which free players, though being
uncoordinated, have an interest in a high-valued solution of the problem (like
in the disaster response application outlined in Section 2). We summarize
this as:
Behavioral Assumption 2. If a free agent f approaches a task t which is
already occupied by a controlled agent, the search continues and the next site
to be approached is
max
f
{t′ ∈ Tf | t′ ≺ t}
as long as there are sites in Tf which were not visited yet.
With these behavioral assumptions made for the free agents, the search
process coincides with the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of Gale and Shap-
ley (1962) with men proposing, where:
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• The free agents in F are the men and the tasksin T are the women.
• The men’s preferences are given by F . All tasks which are not in the
set Tf are considered unacceptable for f .
• The women’s preferences are given by the valuation function v, i.e. for
each t ∈ T we have
f t f ′ ⇔ v(f, t) ≥ v(f ′, t). (3.3)
Together with (3.1), for each t this rule comprises a linear order t on
F .
• Some tasks are blocked, namely those that are occupied by controlled
agents.
We call this procedure the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Blocked Tasks
(DAB).
3.2. Deferred Acceptance Algorithm with Blocked Tasks
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) con-
structs a stable matching in a marriage market. A marriage market is de-
fined as a triple (M,W,), where M is the set of “men” and W is the set of
“women”. A preference profile  maps each m ∈M into a linear preference
order defined over W ∪ {m}, and each w ∈ W into a linear preference order
defined over M ∪ {w} (the item x in x’s preference order stands for the op-
tion of being single).7 Naturally, from the fact that the deferred acceptance
algorithm is finite and produces a unique output (Gale and Shapley (1962)),
it follow that the DAB search process is finite and produces a unique output.
The order in which the free players propose to tasks, and the order in
which they are rejected, does not influence the outcome assignment. This was
shown by McVitie and Wilson (1971), who modified the original algorithm
of Gale and Shapley (1962) so as to let men propose to women sequentially
and in an arbitrary order (in Gale and Shapley (1962), the men propose
simultaneously at each stage). They proved that the matching resulting from
their algorithm is identical to the one generated by the standard deferred
7For a comprehensive discussion of marriage markets, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990),
chapter 2.
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acceptance algorithm. This finding of McVitie and Wilson (1971) implies
that the outcome of the DAB algorithm is not affected by our assumption
that the central planner assigns the coordinated agents first; in the DAB
search process, the output matching would be the same even if the CP would
assign the controlled agents when the free agents were already searching in
the market. This is true as long as the coordinated agents could take away
any task already occupied by a free agent, an assumption which is arguably
reasonably for those applications we described in Section 2.
We define a coordinated assignment to be a matching µC ⊆ C × T (no
free player f is a member of any pair in µC). We denote by (F, T,F )µC a
marriage market formed by free agents and those tasks which are not matched
under µC . Formally,
(F, T,)µC = (F, T \ {t | (c, t) ∈ µC},). (3.4)
Here  is a preference profile which assigns to each t ∈ T a linear order t
according to (3.3) and to each free agent the order f . Given this, the set
µRTA consists of the following assignments:
Definition 1. An assignment µ is RTA-feasible for a runaway task assign-
ment (C ∪ F, T, v,F ) if µ = µF ∪ µC and the matching µF is the outcome
of the DAB in the market (F, T,F )µC .
4. Solution
In this section, we first transform the problem into a mathematical pro-
gram. We then transform the program so that it becomes computationally
manageable. Let binary variables xij indicate whether a controlled agent
i ∈ C is assigned to task j ∈ T , i.e. if xij = 1, then i is assigned to j, and if
xij = 0, then this is not the case. Likewise, variables yij indicate whether a
free agent i is matched to task j. We denote by x and by y matrices which
have |A| rows and |T | columns and whose elements are either 0 or 1.
Theorem 1. The solution to the Semi-Autonomuous Assignment problem
(C ∪ F, T, v,F ),
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coincides with the solution to the optimization problem
max
x
∑
(i,j)∈(C×T )
vijxij + g(x), (4.1)
s.t.
∑
j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ A (4.2)∑
i∈A
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T (4.3)
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (A× T ) (4.4)
where g(x) is the value of the allocation of free agents to the tasks not assigned
to controlled agents by x, i.e.
g(x) = min
y
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij (4.5)
s.t.
∑
j∈T
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ F (4.6)∑
i∈F
yij ≤ 1−
∑
i∈C
xij ∀j ∈ T (4.7)
yij +
∑
kij
yik +
∑
lji
ylj ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T ) (4.8)
yij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T ) (4.9)
Proof. First of all, we show that the solution of the mathematical program
above corresponds to a matching. Constraint (4.2) requires each controlled
agent to be assigned at most one task and constraint (4.3) requires each task
to be allocated to at most one controlled agent. Likewise, constraint (4.6)
requires each free agent to be assigned at most one task and constraint (4.7)
requires each controlled task to be allocated to no free agent if it is already
occupied by a controlled agent, or to at most one free agent otherwise. Con-
straints (4.4) and (4.9) ensure that all variables xij and yij are binary.
Next, we show that the matrix y determined in the solution of the program
corresponds to the outcome of the DAB procedure when only those tasks
are available which are not occupied by controlled agents. As mentioned,
(4.7) ensures that no free agent is matched to a task assigned to a controlled
agent. As we showed in Section 3, the DAB procedure converges to a stable
matching in a marriage market (F, T,F )µC (cf. (3.4) above). We now have
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to show that the matrix y in a solution of the program above corresponds (1)
to the stable matching in the market (F, T,F )µC , where µC is determined
by the matrix x, and (2) that this stable matching corresponds to that stable
matching chosen by the free agents in the DAB search process.
For ensuring that y corresponds to a stable matching in the market
(F, T,F )µC , we include the so called blocking pair constraint (4.8). This
constraint is taken from Roth et al. (1993), who develop stable matching
theory in a mathematical programming framework.
Finally, we have to show that the matching y derived from the solution of the
above program is not just stable, but it is indeed the same stable matching
as the one constructed through the DAB procedure. In DAB, free agents rep-
resent the proposing side, and the procedure converges to a stable matching
that is optimal for the free agents: each agent prefers the optimal matching
over any other stable matching (see Gale and Shapley (1962)). The opti-
mal stable matching for the proposing side coincides with the worst stable
matching of the responding side (Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Theorem 2.13
and Corollary 2.14, p. 33), which means that each task that is not occu-
pied by a controlled agent prefers any other stable matching in the market
(F, T,F )µC over the matching selected through DAB. Let t be a task which
is not occupied by a controlled agent and let (t, f ∗) be the pair formed un-
der the matching constructed through the DAB algorithm. Moreover, let
B(t) ⊆ T × F be the set
B(t) := {(t, f) | (t, f) ⊆ µ, µ is a stable matching in (F, T,F )µC}.
By definition of the “preferences” of the tasks (see (3.3) above) the fact that
the constructed matching is the task-worst implies that
(t, f ∗) = argmin(t,f)∈B(t)v(t, f).
Verbally, if Ft denotes the set of free agents that perform task t in some
stable matching in the market (F, T,F )µC , then, in the free-agent-optimal
matching, task t is performed by the least-qualified among these agents—
arg minf∈Ft v(t, f).
It follows that the objective function for the assignment of free agents, which
corresponds to the matching chosen by the DAB algorithm in the market
(F, T,F )µC , is given by (4.5).
The integrality constraint (4.9) can be relaxed as has been shown by
Vande Vate (1989, Theorem 16), allowing to replace it with a nonnegativity
constraint.
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The SAAP can thus be fully specified as the following bilevel mixed in-
teger linear program SAAP(2LMILP):
max
x
∑
(i,j)∈(C×T )
vijxij +
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij
s.t.
∑
j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C∑
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
y solves min
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
vijyij∑
j∈T
yij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ F∑
i∈F
yij ≤ 1−
∑
i∈C
xij ∀j ∈ T
yij +
∑
kij
yik +
∑
lji
ylj ≥ 1 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
yij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
Formally, we have a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem—a hier-
archical program in which the set of constraints contains a parametric opti-
misation problem. Solving bilevel programs is difficult in general, let alone
solving one with binary variables, and applying known algorithms to the
program at hand would yield solutions only for extremely small problem in-
stances. The most popular method for solving bilevel programs is to replace
the second level with a set of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions and
then add these constraints to the first level to form a Mathematical Program
with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) (Luo et al. (1996)). However, this in-
troduces a set of complementary constraints that are difficult to deal with.8
In fact, solving a linear bilevel program in which all functions are linear is
8The complementary constraints can then be transformed into a new set of constraints
that involve integer variables using a Big-M method. Alternatively, nonlinear programming
relaxation can be used to approximate these complementary constraints.
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already strongly NP-hard (Marcotte and Savard (2005)).9 In our case, the
upper level contains binary variables and hence the problem is even more
difficult.
For devising a way how to practically solve the SAAP problem, we will show
that (SAAP(2LMILP)) is equivalent to a disjoint bilinear program, which
is much more manageable computationally,10 as stated in the following the-
orem:
Theorem 2. The SAAP bilevel mixed integer linear programming model
(SAAP(2LMILP)) is equivalent to the following disjoint bilinear program
SAAP(DBL):
max
x,λ,β,γ
∑
i∈C,j∈T
vijxij +
∑
i∈F
λi +
∑
j∈T
βj(1−
∑
i∈C
xij) +
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t.
∑
j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C∑
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ≥ 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
λi + βj + γij +
∑
k≺ij
γik +
∑
l≺ji
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0,β ≤ 0,γ ≥ 0.
At a high level, the transformation of (SAAP(2LMILP)) into a bilin-
ear program involves three steps. First, we replace the linear program on
the second level with its dual. Since the primal was a minimisation prob-
lem, the dual is a maximisation problem. Having maximisation in both first
and second stages lets us combine the objectives and reduce the problem
to a single-stage optimisation. The resulting problem belongs to the class
of mixed integer non-convex quadratic programming problems and is still
9Even checking local optimality in linear bilevel programming is NP-hard, cf. Marcotte
and Savard (2005).
10Although solving bilinear programs is still NP-hard (Audet et al. (1999)), the mathe-
matical programming formulation is in a much nicer form, i.e. we only have to deal with
a single minimisation problem instead of a minimax problem. Notice that not all linear
bilevel programs can be transformed into a bilinear problem. However, a disjoint bilinear
program can be transformed into a linear bilevel program.
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quite difficult to solve. We then exploit the special structure of the problem
to note that the integrality constraints on x can be dropped obtaining a
bilinear program. The details follow in the proof.
Proof. Let λi, βj and γij be dual variables for constraints (4.6)-(4.8) for all
(i, j) ∈ (F × T ). The dual problem is formulated as:
max
λ,β,γ
∑
i∈F
λi +
∑
j∈T
(1−
∑
i∈C
xij)βj +
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t. λi + βj + γij +
∑
k≺ij
γik +
∑
l≺ji
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0,β ≤ 0,γ ≥ 0.
Plugging the dual into the original problem and combining two max op-
erators, we obtain the following problem:
max
x,λ,β,γ
∑
i∈C,j∈T
vijxij +
∑
i∈F
λi +
∑
j∈T
βj(1−
∑
i∈C
xij) +
∑
(i,j)∈(F×T )
γij
s.t.
∑
j∈T
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C∑
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1} ∀(i, j) ∈ (C × T )
λi + βj + γij +
∑
kij
γik +
∑
lji
γlj ≤ vij ∀(i, j) ∈ (F × T )
λ ≤ 0,β ≤ 0,γ ≥ 0.
The objective function contains linear terms on (x,λ,β,γ) and a bilinear
term −(∑(i,j)∈(C×T ) βjxij). Without this bilinear term, the problem will be
equivalent to two separate optimisation problems: an assignment problem
and a (dual of a) stable matching problem. Due to the presence of the
bilinear terms together with the integrality constraint on xij, this problem
belongs to the class of mixed integer non-convex quadratic programming
problems and is quite difficult to solve. However, once we fix (λ,β,γ), the
13
objective function is linear on x. The problem becomes:
max
x
∑
i∈C,j∈T
(vij − βj)xij
s.t.
∑
j
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ C∑
i∈C
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T
xij ∈ {0, 1}
This is an assignment problem,11 and hence the integrality constraint can
be relaxed (see for example Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997, Corollary 7.2)).
Thus, for every solution λ,β,γ (or equivalently, for every y) to the agent-
optimal stable matching problem, there is an integer solution x that is opti-
mal. In other words, there is always an integer solution x that is optimal, and
we can drop the integrality constraints in SAAP. This leads to the disjoint
bilevel program SAAP(DBL).
There is an extensive literature on bilinear programming. In particular, a
simple greedy approach, such as ‘hill climbing’ (see, e.g., Russell and Norvig
(2003)), may obtain high-quality solutions in little time. This is done by iter-
atively solving an LP for optimal (λ,β,γ) for each fixed x and then solving
another LP for an optimal x by fixing the newly found (λ,β,γ). This pro-
cess is repeated until the optimal value does not improve. At that point we
obtain a locally optimal solution. It is noted also that the disjoint constraint
sets in the SAAP problem are quite nice. The constraints on x define an
assignment polyhedron with known extreme points and the constraints on
(λ,β,γ) correspond to a dual feasible space of the stable matching problem.
This means the LP problems can be solved very efficiently and the algorithm
converges very fast to a local optimal solution. White (1992) converts a bi-
linear program into a big LP whose constraints are generated sequentially
through solving smaller LPs. This methods promises finite convergence and
can be used to solve SAAP(DBL) as the assignment problem and the sta-
ble matching problem can be solved very efficiently. The bilinear program
11In the variant of the assignment problem stated here, the number of tasks may be
different from the number of agents and tasks/agents may be left unassigned. One can
convert this version to the standard assignment problem by adding dummy tasks/agents.
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can also be reduced to a concave minimisation problem where an outter ap-
proximation algorithm can be applied (Thieu (1988)). More recent advanced
methods for solving disjoint bilinear programming can be found in Alarie
et al. (2001) who apply cutting plane methods to produce global optimal
solutions. Alarie et al. (2001) show that cutting plane methods can be used
to solve disjoint bilinear programming problems with up to 500 variables in
each disjoint set and with 100 constraints.
5. Conclusions
Our work introduces assignment problems in which autonomous agents
are placed together with those fully controlled by a central planner. The
autonomous agents act to obtain their own individual goals. The central
planner coordinates the controlled agents with the aim to optimise the over-
all performance of the system, while taking into account the behaviour of
the self-motivated participants. This scenario resembles many economic sit-
uations, some of which were outlined in Section 2. SAAP belongs to models
which combine rational and boundedly rational agents, which are rare in the
game theoretic literature, though in reality many situations of this kind can
be found.12
Clearly, the search process assumed for the free agents in SAAP is not the
only reasonable model. Indeed, there are many other possibilities for how one
could model the behaviour of the free agents. For example, many real-world
scenarios could be better described with a stochastic search process. One
might also consider search strategies taken from cognitive psychology, like
the famous satisficing heuristic of Simon (1957) or the take-the-best heuristic
of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). It may be a worthwhile effort to perform
a similar analysis like the one presented in this paper, but with alternative
behavioural assumptions for the free agents.
Despite of its various reasonable alternatives, we want to stress that the
search process modelled in this article has some intriguing features. Firstly,
it is quite natural to assume that the free agents check for free tasks in
order of their preferences. Secondly, the order in which free players propose
12For example, in stock exchange markets, humans trade simultaneously with computer
programs. The computers act extremely fast, without any psychological biases, and they
have superior computing power—hence they could be considered to be fully rational play-
ers.
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to tasks, and the order in which they are rejected, does not influence the
outcome assignment as the DAB procedure leads to a unique outcome. This
follows from McVitie and Wilson (1971), as discussed in Section 3. Thirdly,
in the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) there is no
incentive for the proposing side, in our case the free agents, to misrepresent
their preferences (cf. Dubins and Freedman (1981), Roth (1982)). In our
context, this means that the free agents cannot improve their outcome by
changing the order in which they approach tasks. So even if free agents
would have enough information and computing power to act strategically,
it would not be worthwhile to do this. In contrast, alternative models of
search behaviour would have to take care of strategic manipulations on the
free agents’ parts. Of course, this makes handling our model convenient, yet
does not support the empirical validity of the DAB assumption.
Other modifications to our model come to mind. It may be interesting
to change the informational assumptions of the model. What if the produc-
tivities of the autonomous workers for different tasks is private knowledge of
that worker?13 Would there be a way to make the free agents reveal their
private information? Could they even be incentivised to pick the task which
would be best from the central planner’s point of view? Designing a transfer
scheme to achieve such goals would demand the free agents to be modelled
with cardinal preferences. Arguably, this would reduce the robustness of
the model, but it might lead to economically interesting dynamics similar to
those which can be found in the famous labour market adjustment models
of Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso and Crawford (1982).
The idea of introducing autonomous agents in scenarios where the cen-
tral planner normally has full control is not limited to assignment problems.
Many other standard problems could be extended to include autonomous
agents. Transportation or network flow with some transfers performed by
autonomous agents, knapsack where autonomous agents are able to add their
own items to the knapsack, and graph colouring with some nodes coloured
by the agents are just a few examples.
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